

Opposition Claims Against The Umayyads: “Al-Harith Ibn Surayj, Abdullah Ibn Muawiyah”

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Abstract

Keywords:

Rebellion,
Khorasan, Mawali,
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transmigration of
souls, Qays and
Yemen.

This study examines two major opposition movements that emerged during the final phase of the Umayyad dynasty's decline: the movements led by Al-Harith ibn Surayj and Abdullah ibn Mu'awiyah. Both movements are analyzed as significant contributors to political fragmentation and the eventual collapse of Umayyad rule. Rather than focusing solely on political or military dimensions, the study explores the intellectual and philosophical foundations of each movement by analyzing the declared narratives and underlying objectives articulated by their leaders. Al-Harith ibn Surayj presented his movement as a reformist call rooted in adherence to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, emphasizing justice and resistance to Umayyad oppression. While this discourse attracted broad popular support, the study reveals that his movement was shaped by a theological orientation closely linked to extremist Murji'ah thought. This doctrinal background influenced both the ideological framework and political strategy of his movement, shaping his stance toward Umayyad authority and affecting the reception of his call among various social groups. In contrast, Abdullah ibn Mu'awiyah exploited widespread social dissatisfaction and political instability to launch his rebellion. However, his movement was grounded in heterodox intellectual doctrines, including beliefs in the transmigration of souls and claims to divine attributes. Furthermore, the heterogeneous composition of his followers comprising Zaydi Shiites, mawālī, and Abbasid sympathizers proved to be a structural weakness. The lack of a coherent ideological foundation ultimately undermined the sustainability of his movement. The study concludes that, despite their differing ideological orientations, both movements significantly weakened Umayyad authority, facilitating the dynasty's collapse and the rise of Abbasid rule.

Abstrak

Kata kunci:
Pemberontakan,
Khorasan, Mawali,
Syi'ah, Murji'ah,
perpindahan jiwa,
Qays dan Yaman.

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Penelitian ini mengkaji dua gerakan oposisi utama yang muncul pada fase akhir kemunduran Dinasti Umayyah, yaitu gerakan yang dipimpin oleh Al-Harith ibn Surayj dan Abdullah ibn Mu'awiyah. Kedua gerakan tersebut dianalisis sebagai faktor penting yang berkontribusi terhadap fragmentasi politik dan keruntuhan kekuasaan Umayyah. Berbeda dari kajian yang hanya menitikberatkan pada aspek politik atau militer, penelitian ini menelusuri landasan intelektual dan filosofis dari masing-masing gerakan melalui analisis terhadap narasi yang dikemukakan secara terbuka serta tujuan-tujuan tersembunyi yang dirumuskan oleh para pemimpinnya. Al-Harith ibn Surayj menampilkkan gerakannya sebagai seruan reformis yang berakar pada kepatuhan terhadap Al-Qur'an dan Sunnah, dengan penekanan pada keadilan dan perlawanannya terhadap penindasan Umayyah. Meskipun wacana ini berhasil menarik dukungan luas dari masyarakat, penelitian ini mengungkap bahwa gerakannya dibentuk oleh orientasi teologis yang erat kaitannya dengan pemikiran Murji'ah ekstrem. Latar belakang doktrinal tersebut memengaruhi kerangka ideologis dan strategi politik gerakannya, sekaligus membentuk sikapnya terhadap otoritas Umayyah serta memengaruhi penerimaan masyarakat terhadap seruannya. Sebaliknya, Abdullah ibn Mu'awiyah memanfaatkan ketidakpuasan sosial dan ketidakstabilan politik yang meluas untuk melancarkan pemberontakannya. Namun, gerakannya berlandaskan pada doktrin intelektual yang menyimpang, seperti kepercayaan terhadap reinkarnasi jiwa dan klaim sifat ketuhanan. Selain itu, komposisi pengikutnya yang heterogen terdiri atas kelompok Syiah Zaidiyah, mawālī, dan simpatisan Abbasiyah menjadi titik kelemahan struktural. Ketiadaan landasan ideologis yang koheren pada akhirnya melemahkan keberlanjutan gerakan

tersebut. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa, meskipun memiliki orientasi ideologis yang berbeda, kedua gerakan tersebut secara signifikan melemahkan otoritas Dinasti Umayyah dan membuka jalan bagi keruntuhannya serta bangkitnya Dinasti Abbasiyah.

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Umayyad dynasty was marked by a period of profound political and social turmoil that shook the foundations of the state. The killing of Caliph Al-Walid ibn Yazid in 126 AH was the event that heralded the downfall of this ruling house, as the state entered a whirlpool of revolutions and rebellions that led to its political disintegration. Amidst this chaos, numerous opposition movements emerged, some disappearing quickly while others gained widespread influence, exploiting the state of anarchy and the weakening of central authority. Among these movements, those of Al-Harith ibn Surayj and Abdullah ibn Muawiyah stand out due to their significant and noticeable impact on the course of events. While many historical studies have dealt with the events of these two revolts, this study attempts a new approach by analyzing the intellectual and philosophical aspects of their calls, which have not been comprehensively addressed in previous research.

This research specifically discusses the call of Al-Harith ibn Surayj in terms of its declared reformist philosophy and its doctrinal background, his stance towards the Umayyad caliphs, and his relationship with the call of Abu Muslim Al-Khurasani. It also analyzes the rebellion of Abdullah ibn Muawiyah, discussing his heretical intellectual principles and his party's diverse formations, concluding that the lack of a coherent ideological basis was one of the primary weaknesses of his revolution. The research aims to highlight how these movements, despite their differing motivations and formations, were an integral part of the chain of events that ultimately led to the fall of Umayyad rule and the rise of the Abbasid state.

The killing of Al-Walid ibn Yazid was the sign that heralded the fall of the Umayyad dynasty. This ruling dynasty had politically collapsed and was engulfed in the whirlpool of revolution. The revolutionaries had established themselves, and their power had increased in the Levant as well. Anyone who follows that era can visualize the extent to which the state's authority was shaken from the core to the periphery. The bonds that held the central power began to unravel everywhere, and the fires of rebellion and disobedience were ignited.

Amid that turmoil, gatherings would appear that would soon disappear. The various agitated elements would gather around one point, then disperse after that, and enter into other organizations. The death of Al-Walid ibn Yazid, 126 AH, marked the end of the Umayyad state. The revolutionary Khawarij call was a great success in the countries and soon spread in the Levant.

Also, after the Umayyads themselves lost the prestige of the caliphate, it, and thus, the political disintegration began until Marwan bin Muhammad (Al-Tabari, n.d., pp. 239–247; Khalifa bin Khayyat, n.d., pp. 363–364; Al-Masudi, n.d., pp. 176–180; Al-Baladhuri, n.d., pp. 165–182; Ibn Al-Athir, n.d., pp. 299–306; Ibn Al-Jawzi, n.d., pp. 703–707; Ibn Kathir, n.d., pp. 160–181). This dissolution has been addressed in the chapter's discussions in general, but in this section, the researcher has focused on the call of "Al-Harith bin Surayj" and "Abdullah bin Muawiyah" without others, due to the extent of the influence of the two calls on the course of events in a noticeable way on the one hand, and the other hand, that Al-Harith and Ibn Muawiyah had many controversial positions that were not studied comprehensively, so the researcher will address the topic through issues the following: The issue First: The supplication of Al-Harith bin Surayj and The rebellion of Abdullah bin Muawiyah bin Abdullah bin Jaafar.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a qualitative approach using historical research with an analytical-critical orientation. This approach is chosen to examine the political and social dynamics during the final period of the Umayyad dynasty, particularly those related to the emergence of the movements of Al-Harith ibn Surayj and Abdullah ibn Mu'awiyah. The main focus of the study is not merely on the chronology of events, but also on the analysis of the intellectual, ideological, and philosophical dimensions of the calls and orientations of these two figures within the context of the crisis of Umayyad political legitimacy (Donner, 2010; Lapidus, 2014).

This research is categorized as library research, with primary sources consisting of classical Islamic historical works such as Tarikh al-Tabari, Tarikh Khalifah ibn Khayyat, Muruj al-Dhahab by al-Mas'udi, Ansab al-Ashraf by al-Baladhuri, al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh by Ibn al-Athir, and other classical texts that document political events of the second century Hijri (Al-Tabari, n.d.; Ibn al-Athir, n.d.; Al-Baladhuri, n.d.). Secondary sources are drawn from academic books and contemporary journal articles that discuss the Umayyad dynasty, opposition movements, and the development of early Islamic political and religious thought (Kennedy, 2004; Madelung, 1997).

Data collection is carried out through documentation techniques, namely by tracing, recording, and critically examining texts relevant to the research topic. The collected data include historical narratives of the rebellions of Al-Harith ibn Surayj and Abdullah ibn Mu'awiyah, their ideological views and political positions toward Umayyad authority, as well as assessments by historians regarding the roles and impacts of these two movements in the process leading to the collapse of the Umayyad dynasty (Crone, 1980; Shaban, 1971).

Data analysis is conducted through stages of data reduction, content analysis, and historical interpretation. Data reduction aims to select information relevant to the focus of the study, while content analysis is used to uncover the ideological and philosophical meanings embedded in the calls of both figures (Krippendorff, 2019). Subsequently, the data are interpreted historically by considering the socio-political context of the period. The validity of the data is ensured through source criticism and triangulation by comparing various historical accounts and perspectives from both classical and modern historians (Gottschalk, 1969; Howell & Prevenier, 2001).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Issue First: The supplication of Al-Harith bin Surayj:

The Philosophy of Al-Harith ibn Surayj's call:

When reading the call of Al-Harith bin Surayj, the reader will find himself in front of an intellectual philosophy similar to the ideas of the calls that appeared on the political scene in the issue of rebellion against the Umayyad authority. The researcher believes that the core of Al-Harith bin Surayj's call was in rejecting the injustice of the Umayyad government. It can be said that this is the alleged entrance of Al-Harith in his call as a reform call. Al-Harith considered himself a reformist preacher, and he dedicated his reform to religious reform concerned with the issue of the caliphate in the first place, so he called for the caliphate in light of the Qur'an and the Sunnah (Al-Tabari, n.d., pp. 154-158). Rather, he called for it in the necessity of empowering the people of goodness (the people of righteousness, as he says, and he singled out the family of the Prophet (Ibn Kathir, n.d., p. 214). May God bless him and grant him peace. Perhaps this was a tool to attract sympathizers to his call, as will become clear later.

Perhaps it is useful to stand on Al-Harith's opinion on the caliphate of Marwan without discussing the events of that; due to the large number of studies that have dealt with these events, and since the purpose of the study is to attempt to address something new in what other studies have not dealt with, the concern in this place is not to present repeated events, but rather the concern is to explain Al-Harith bin Surayj's intellectual, philosophical and formative call, and to

analyze it historically and jurisprudentially, and this is what the research will discuss through the following:

The doctrinal background and its impact on Al-Hari's thought

He pointed out Hawting To the sympathy of the Arab tribes of Mudar and Yemen with the movement of Al-Harith bin Surayj, who was a Tamimi (Mudari) Arab who led a revolution of Arabs and Mawali, to demand their rights as Muslims and opponents of the Umayyads, on religious grounds, to demand their acceptance according to the Book and the Sunnah, but they wanted to ally with the non-Muslim Turks within the framework of their quest to achieve their demands, and this was the first case in which Muslims wanted to unite with non-Muslims against other Muslims (Hawting, n.d., p. 86)

The researcher believes that Al-Harith used a special method to attract opponents (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 280). He showed people that he was striving to work according to the Book of God, to employ people of goodness and virtue, to denounce injustice, and to promote his call. His biography was mentioned on the road to Marv and in the mosques, and a large number joined him and became his followers (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 293). His position towards Juday' bin Ali al-Karmani was when he sent him saying: "If Nasr gives me the ability to work according to the Book of God and what I asked him to do in terms of employing people of goodness and virtue, I will support him and carry out God's command. If he does not do so, I will seek God's help against him, and I will help you if you guarantee me what I want in terms of carrying out justice and the Sunnah." (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 155). This was an exploitation of the hostile position between Nasr and Al-Karmani to his advantage.

Dimensions And In the invitation of Hot Tha' ibn Surayj:

Al-Harith ibn Surayj was a student of Jahm ibn Safwan (Al-Jahm ibn Safwan, n.d.). He took Jahm as his minister and his call and spread its foundations (Al-Qasimi, 1979, p. 12). This Jahm was one of the extremist Murji'ah, and Al-Harith used to follow the Irja'i school of thought. Al-Tabari also mentioned this (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 158). The origin of the statement of Irja' is among the beliefs of the Jahmites, and this is in the matter of faith. Faith, according to them, is only the belief of the heart and its knowledge; therefore, disbelief, according to them, is only ignorance of God (Ibn Hazm, 1999, p. 142). Thus, the Jahmites are Murji'ites in the matter of faith and not others (Al-Hanbali, 1418 AH, p. 77). This is evident in what Al-Tabari narrated: When Al-Harith left the land of the Turks for Khorasan and went to Nasr bin Sayyar, he refused to pledge allegiance to Marwan bin Muhammad, saying: Yazid ibn al-Walid gave

me security, and Marwan does not accept Yazid's security, so I do not give him security. Then he called for allegiance and said: I see that al-Kirmani has authority, and the matter is in Nasr's hand. He sent it to Nasr and said to him: Make the matter a matter of consultation. Nasr refused, so al-Harith rebelled against him.

And in this, he says: Wellhausen, "Perhaps what reveals the best tendencies of Al-Harith, and his supporters, is that they are called Murji'ah, a name that was often given to them. The Murji'ah opposed the Khawarij in their excommunication of the three caliphs (Ali, Uthman, and Mu'awiyah and their supporters. They believed that everyone who believes in the oneness of God is not an unbeliever, and that is due to God on the Day of Judgment, regardless of their sins that make them guilty. That is, they postponed the judgment on the faith of their brothers in religion to God alone." (Wellhausen, n.d., pp. 441-442).

The reader of the events of the second century of the Prophet's migration regarding the news of Al-Harith bin Surayj will find that it is extremely strange, and his news indicates that he was keen to spread justice, and that he was against injustice and its people, and his desire to work with the Book and the Sunnah and make the matter a matter of consultation is evident, except that Al-Harith was an ambitious person who adopted the ideas of Irja' (Al-Qasimi, 1979, p. 16)

The position of Al-Harith ibn Surayj regarding the Umayyad Caliphs (Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, Yazid ibn al-Walid, and Marwan ibn Muhammad):

Al-Harith bin Surayj incited people and filled them with hatred against the Umayyad authority, and then he seized the time that he saw as favorable to start his revolution. In the year 116 AH, he rebelled against the governor of the Caliph Hisham bin Abdul Malik, "Asim bin Abdullah," in Khorasan, and called for his removal and the annulment of the pledge of allegiance to Hisham.

When reading in this regard, the researcher noticed that Al-Harith's exit was an exit in the shadow of his reformist call - as previously indicated - and this call crystallized in the title that had the greatest influence on the souls of the masses who supported him, which was (Reform in the Light of the Book and the Sunnah and the Call for Contentment, promising that the jizya would not be taken from those who embraced Islam, and that none of them would be wronged (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 155). The researcher believes that these are the mechanisms that Al-Harith called for in his call to gain the sympathy of the loyalists who joined him after that, as we will see later.

The position of Al-Harith bin Surayj regarding the caliphate of Yazid, as the researcher sees it, comes with something of a high-ranking intellectual technique, as he relied on deception and "psychological warfare", as after the caliphate of

Yazid, tribal fanaticism occurred between Nasr bin Sayyar "the Qaysi" and Juday' al-Kirmani "the Yemeni", so Al-Harith exploited this to promote his call in the lands of the Turks, so that he would carry Nasr despite his fear - as the researcher sees - and indeed Nasr bin Sayyar feared that Al-Harith would come with his soldiers and supporters from the Turks and others to Khorasan and would strike him down and be more severe on him than his opponent Al-Kirmani, so he sent Nasr - who took the initiative to neutralize him, meaning: Al-Harith - to Yazid bin Al-Walid to take a guarantee of safety for Al-Harith, then Al-Harith returned to Khorasan 127 AH (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 270).

When Al-Harith returned to Khurasan, his plans became clear to him. He felt fear and humiliation in Nasr, so he quickly turned against him and revealed his hidden intentions. He called in Marv to work according to the Book and the Sunnah and to employ the righteous. Then he sent for Nasr to inform him of this; otherwise, he would fight him. He also sent to Al-Karmani his readiness to cooperate with him against Nasr bin Sayyar on the condition that he establish work according to the Book and the Sunnah (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 279)

After the caliphate passed to Marwan bin Muhammad, Al-Harith refused his caliphate and immediately revolted against him, abandoning his obedience, calling for the implementation of Sharia, working with the Book and the Sunnah, and seeking help from the people of goodness and righteousness (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 292). Whoever contemplates what was narrated about the killing of Al-Harith bin Surayj will know that his killing was for a political, not a religious, reason (Al-Qasimi, 1979, p. 16). This is what the Chief of Police, Nasr bin Yasar, declared when he said: "By God, no Yemeni will rise against us more than you did, so be vigilant and do not be a prisoner of imitation." (Al-Qasimi, 1979, p. 12).

The relationship between Al-Harith ibn Surayj and Abu Muslim Al-Khurasani:

Some researchers have a close relationship between the call of Al-Harith bin Surayj and the call of Abu Muslim Al-Khurasani. The researcher will discuss what they mentioned through the formative issue of the opposition "the loyalists and the Shiites as a model" - that is, the formation of the opposition and its beginnings.

He pointed out that Wellhausen, there is a close relationship between Al-Harith bin Surayj and Abu Muslim Al-Khurasani. (Wellhausen, n.d., p. 503) And he was followed in that by trying to reconcile the two calls and the Mawali and Shiites joining each of them (Crone, n.d., p. 104). The researcher agrees with this vision, which was confirmed by the historical contexts that deal with the Umayyad opposition movements, as he finds the great influence of both the

loyalists and the Shiites on the opposition movements, and both Al-Harith bin Surayj and Abu Muslim Al-Kurasani participated in raising the black banners, as he indicated... Wellhausen Until Al-Harith ibn, the first to lead the revolution of the Mawali in the name of Islam, and he had a black flag, and the same was the case for the Abbasids (Wellhausen, n.d., p. 504). This is what Al-Tabari mentioned: Al-Harith "approached Marv and blackened his banners..." (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 158) And in another place: "And Al-Harith used to show that he was the owner of the black banners." (Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 292).

While he put forward Vloten, "There is a relationship between the black flags and the fight against misguidance, in its meaning mentioned in the Qur'an, and transgression as a departure from divine rule, and the aforementioned flags represent the banner of the Messenger, and all sources agree that it is black in colour." (Vloten, n.d., p. 112). Here in the contemplative, does no connection between blackness and fighting misguidance in the manner he mentioned. However, it is a mere claim, and this was also not mentioned in light of historical texts. As it was proposed, Crone followed similar mechanisms, "the call to contentment, or the Book and the Sunnah," she indicated: "The call to contentment among the Abbasids was like the call to the Book and the Sunnah and the people of righteousness among Al-Harith bin Surayj." (Crone, n.d., p. 102). There is no doubt that although there was a similarity in some of the mechanisms of the calls, the formative structures for esotericism were very different.

And it has been sealed. Wellhausen's book "The History of the Arab State" states that these calls were the reason for the fall of the Umayyads and the decline of the people of the Levant as well. Before that, they had surrendered Marwan bin Muhammad, who was hated by them, to his destined fate. They did not care to fight the Abbasids before the appropriate time was over. After that, they were unable to change the situation, so the blacks won, and the whites lost their kingdom. The Abbasids called their government the state (I mean: the new era. The reality is that the revolution that had taken place was enormous (Wellhausen, n.d., p. 526).

The second point: The rebellion of Abdullah bin Muawiyah bin Abdullah bin Jaafar:

An offer. Wellhausen calls Ibn Muawiyah, who is Abdullah bin Muawiyah bin Abdullah bin Jaafar bin Abi Talib (d. 131 AH, he lived among the people of Kufa and married into a prominent family, and it seemed that he was worthy of the caliphate. Abdullah bin Muawiyah showed his readiness to go out for the sake of the caliphate, and the Zaidi Shiites (Al-Shahrastani, n.d., p. 179) They

were his supporters, headed by Zayd ibn Ali (d. 122 AH, and among them were many loyalists, and the people of Kufa pledged allegiance to him. Then he went out to Al-Madain, then to the mountainous country of "Media". Then the people of the city pledged allegiance to him, then to Halwan, Qumis, Isfahan, and Rayy. Many of the Persian slaves and clients joined him, and others from the Umayyads and Abbasids who did not feel safe in their homelands joined him, so they hid under his wing, hoping to gain a connection or authority from him (Wellhausen, n.d., p. 370). Abdullah ibn Muawiyah was eliminated by Abdullah ibn Umar, but Ibn Umar did not recognize the caliphate of Marwan ibn Muhammad (d. 132 AH, who was the governor of Iraq. Marwan ibn Muhammad could not do more than appoint one of his senior men to be a governor as a rival to Abdullah ibn Umar ibn Abdul Aziz, namely Al-Nadr ibn Saeed Al-Harshi (Wellhausen, n.d., p. 372; Hawting, n.d., pp. 100-102; Ramli, n.d., p. 151).

She pointed out that Abdullah bin Muawiyah's call was against the tyranny of the Umayyad rule; he believed in consultation and empowering the family of the Prophet, who were more deserving of the caliphate (Crone, 2001, p. 31).

Consequences of the Pledge of Allegiance to Abdullah ibn Muawiyah:

Abdullah ibn Muawiyah appeared during the reign of Caliph Marwan ibn Muhammad as a preacher calling for allegiance and the removal of Marwan ibn Muhammad. He pledged allegiance to himself in Khorasan, and that was after the failure of the revolution of Imam Zayd ibn Ali. What strengthened the pledge of allegiance to Abdullah ibn Muawiyah was that he was from the family of the Prophet, as he was the son of Ja'far ibn Abi Talib, the brother of Ali ibn Abi Talib. His call had a great impact in attracting crowds of Shiites towards him, and the Shiites of Kufa joined him.

When reading the repercussions of his pledge of allegiance, we will find different narrations about that. It was mentioned that Abdullah bin Muawiyah showed his disagreement with Abdullah bin Omar, and he rebelled against him, calling for the pledge of allegiance for himself. The reason for that was that Abdullah bin Muawiyah came to Kufa, visiting Abdullah bin Omar bin Abdul Aziz, seeking to connect with him and not wanting to rebel, so he married the daughter of Hatim Al-Sharqi. (Hatem Bin Abd al-Mu'min bin Shabath bin Rabi'iWhen the Asabiyyah occurred, the people of Kufa said to him: Call for yourself, for the Banu Hashim are more deserving of the matter than the Banu Marwan. So he called secretly Kufa, and Ibn Umar in Al-Hirah. Then Ibn Muawiyah went out to Al-Madain, and its people pledged allegiance to him. Then he went out and conquered Halwan and the mountains. It was said that he conquered Al-Mahin, Hamadan, Qumis, Isfahan, and Rayy (Al-Tabari, n.d., pp.

275–276). Historical accounts mention that he was pledged allegiance to as caliph in Isfahan in the year 127 AH, and that he ruled Persia and Kerman, and his followers, soldiers, and money increased.

Al-Tabari mentions in another context that the reason for his pledge of allegiance was what the Shiites saw as Ibn Omar's weakness in Al-Hirah, so they exploited him, dared to attack him, coveted him, and called for Abdullah bin Muawiyah bin Jaafar(Al-Tabari, n.d., p. 277).

Heretical intellectual principles in Ibn Muawiyah's call:

Ibn Muawiyah was not satisfied with the pledge of allegiance to him by the Shiites, but his thinking deviated to say that the spirit of God was transferred to him from the Messenger through his ancestors, thus laying the foundation of the extremist Shiite beliefs later on(Brockelmann, n.d., p. 164). And Abdullah bin Muawiyah had strange principles, including his belief in the transmigration of souls, and that reward and punishment are in this transmigration. He went so far as to say that the spirit of God was transfigured until it reached him. He claimed both prophethood and divinity, and that he knew the unseen. His followers worshipped him and disbelieved in the Resurrection because they believed that transmigration would take place in this world(Al-Baghdadi, n.d., p. 255; Al-Shahrastani, n.d., p. 151; Ibn Hazm, n.d., p. 143). And from him originated the Khurramites(Al-Dhahabi, n.d., p. 235; Al-Zahrani, 1411 AH, p. 18). And the Rwandan Iraq (Abu Jib, 1982, p. 48) With the death of Abdullah in Khorasan, his companions split into sects. Some of them said that he was alive and residing on the mountain of Isfahan and would emerge. They denied the Day of Resurrection and made permissible the forbidden things of wine, carrion, adultery, and others.

The different formations of Ibn Muawiyah's party structure:

His party consisted of Zaidi Shiites, Mawali, slaves, Abbasids, and many rebellious extremists, in addition to many Arabs who were resentful of the Umayyad authority, such as the Rabi'a tribe (Al-Tabari, n.d., pp. 275–277, 316). It should be noted here that this was the first time that the Mawali had participated on a large scale in major uprisings in the empire, and this indicates that Islam was beginning to take root in western Iran and that its new converts were increasingly influenced by the movement of assimilation and integration (Crone, n.d., p. 27; Wellhausen, n.d., p. 370). And since the Marwanid regime, which was considered to be completely opposed to this movement, showed clear signs of imminent collapse, these loyalists did not hesitate to support the revolution of Abdullah bin Muawiyah (Shaaban, n.d., p. 180). As Heinz Halm noted, Ibn

Muawiyah was supported by Kaysani groups. From the people of Kufa and Madain in his disobedience (Halm, 2010, p. 47) Perhaps this homogeneity and disparity in the parties opposing the Umayyad state - the party of Ibn Muawiyah - was one of the reasons for the weakness of the call of Abdullah Ibn Muawiyah, due to the disparity of interests, including that the Khawarij had a different vision from the Shiites, and if we wanted to compare the vision of the Khawarij and the Shiites, we would find vast distances. The Arabs' ambitions differed from the goals of the Abbasids, so they misjudged the situation by joining Ibn Muawiyah, as I mentioned previously, and the evidence for that is that the death of Ibn Muawiyah was at the hands of Abu Muslim al-Khurasani. The Abbasids' joining of Ibn Muawiyah's party was not noble, as was the case with the rest of the sects. This false Shiite movement, led by Abdullah ibn Muawiyah, turned into a movement in which Shiites, Marwanids, and Abbasids participated. Every attempt to find an ideological basis for this mixture constitutes a challenge to logic. The lack of ideology was the basic weak point in this revolution, in addition to the complete lack of organization.

Discussion

The analysis of the rebellions led by Al-Harith ibn Surayj and Abdullah ibn Muawiyah reveals them as critical nodes in the chain of events that culminated in the fall of the Umayyad dynasty. Both movements arose from the profound political and social turmoil following the assassination of Caliph Al-Walid ibn Yazid in 126 AH, a time characterized by the unraveling of central Umayyad authority.

Al-Harith ibn Surayj's movement, while outwardly a call for reform based on the Qur'an and Sunnah and the rejection of Umayyad injustice, was underpinned by the Irja'i school of thought he inherited from his teacher, Jahm ibn Safwan. His political strategy was highly sophisticated, employing a "psychological warfare" approach and exploiting the rivalry between Nasr bin Sayyar (Qaysi) and Juday' al-Kirmani (Yemeni). His early rebellion in 116 AH against Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik's governor, and his later refusal to recognize Marwan ibn Muhammad's caliphate, mark him as a persistent and pragmatic opponent. Crucially, his movement attracted a broad base of support, including Mawali and Arab tribes (Mudar and Yemen), and his use of black banners established a significant symbolic link with the later, successful Abbasid movement of Abu Muslim Al-Khurasani, suggesting a shared mechanism for mobilizing opposition, particularly among the Mawali who were seeking integration and equality within the empire. The researcher concludes that Al-

Harith's ultimate killing was a political rather than a religious necessity for the Umayyad authorities.

In contrast, the rebellion of Abdullah ibn Muawiyah was fueled by his lineage from the Prophet's family (a great-grandson of Ja'far ibn Abi Talib), which initially garnered support from Zaidi Shiites and other disenfranchised groups, including Mawali and even disillusioned Umayyads and Abbasids. His territorial gains in Persia and Kerman were significant (c. 127 AH). However, his movement was ultimately hampered by its lack of a coherent ideological basis and its extreme fragmentation. The intellectual principles he espoused – claiming the transmigration of God's spirit to himself, claiming prophethood and divinity, and promoting the doctrine of transmigration of souls over the Resurrection – were heretical and became the foundation for later extremist Shiite sects like the Khurramites and Rawandiyya. This radical, disorganized ideological mix (Shiites, Marwanids, Abbasids, Mawali, and various Arab tribes all seeking different goals) proved to be the revolution's fundamental weakness, as the researcher notes. The disparate interests and lack of a unified vision within Ibn Muawiyah's party structure made the movement vulnerable, leading to his eventual demise at the hands of the Abbasid agent, Abu Muslim al-Khurasani.

Together, both movements, with their different intellectual underpinnings and formative structures, illustrate the depth of the anti-Umayyad sentiment and the political and doctrinal landscape that the nascent Abbasid state eventually harnessed to consolidate its power.

CONCLUSION

This study confirms that the rebellions led by Al-Harith ibn Surayj and Abdullah ibn Muawiyah were not merely military movements against Umayyad authority, but a profound reflection of the political and intellectual crises that plagued the state in its final days. Both leaders exploited the state of popular discontent and the weakening of central authority, but each followed a different path. While Al-Harith ibn Surayj presented a "reformist" call with a religious facade but an underlying extremist Murji'ah ideology, the rebellion of Abdullah ibn Muawiyah lacked a coherent intellectual foundation, making it a gathering place for diverse and conflicting interests from Shiites, Abbasids, Mawali, and discontented Arab tribes. This ideological disparity within Ibn Muawiyah's movement was the main reason for its weakness and ultimate failure. These movements, along with others, signaled the imminent collapse of the Umayyad state, as internal chaos and rebellions eroded the prestige of the caliphate. Ultimately, these movements weakened the people of the Levant, making them unable to defend Umayyad rule and enabling the "blacks" (Abbasids) to defeat

the “whites” (Umayyads) and end their kingdom. In this context, it can be said that Al-Harith ibn Surayj and Abdullah ibn Muawiyah were not just rebels but an integral part of the complex chain of factors that led to the fall of one of the most prominent.

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